GAO found that the Center for Program Integrity could not demonstrate completion of any of the ten fraud risk assessments it started. Gen Us graphic based on the GAO audit.
Medicare opened 10 risk assessments. Its integrity office could show auditors none was finished.
Two days after CMS announced an antifraud proposal, federal auditors described a weakness in how the agency decides which threats deserve attention.
Medicare’s integrity office can flag a vulnerability without documenting how likely fraud is, how much damage it could cause or whether the existing safeguard would stop it.
Medicare’s integrity office identified 31 topics that warranted a risk assessment. It told federal auditors it had started 10 assessments since 2022, along with 28 summaries of vulnerabilities. By July 2026, the office could produce no evidence that it had finished a single one of those assessments or summaries. Officials told the auditors they had no plans to finalize them.
The Government Accountability Office published that finding on November 18, two days after the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services announced a proposed rule aimed at fraud across several health programs. The audit concerns traditional fee-for-service Medicare, which paid nearly $481 billion in benefits for about 34 million people in 2025. That figure measures the program’s reach. The auditors did not put a dollar value on fraud attributable to the unfinished assessments.
Consider the screening that lets a supplier into Medicare. The Center for Program Integrity identified a weakness in that screening. GAO found that the assessment did not establish how likely someone was to exploit it or how serious the resulting damage could be. That omission matters when officials have to choose between fixing the screening and spending the same resources on a different vulnerability. A list of problems gives them no order of priority.
The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with three of the auditors’ four recommendations. It contested the call to change its vulnerability-management process, arguing that CMS already conducts comprehensive fraud assessments. The department said the documents evolve as conditions change and pointed to a moratorium on enrolling certain medical equipment suppliers. GAO acknowledged that intervention. Its objection was that the process also covers mistakes and other weaknesses, and does not systematically test whether existing safeguards can withstand deliberate deception.
The enrollment moratorium for those equipment suppliers ended August 27. The harder question for the next congressional oversight hearing is which suppliers its safeguards would still admit, how officials tested those safeguards, and where Medicare recorded the result.
Summary
Two days after CMS announced an antifraud proposal, federal auditors described a weakness in how the agency decides which threats deserve attention.
Key facts
By July 2026, the Center for Program Integrity could not show GAO that any of the 10 assessments or 28 related summaries it had started was complete.
GAO found that the assessment of a supplier-screening vulnerability did not evaluate the likelihood or impact of fraud.
HHS agreed with three recommendations and disputed the need to change the vulnerability-management process.
Source Trail
Primary records and direct statements
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